The US in Pakistan

The US in Pakistan
Mon, 06/13/2011 8:50 PM
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/06/13/letter-the-us-pakistan.html

I refer to Janjua’s letter, “Can US act as world’s policeman?”, published in the Post, June 4.
He forgets that Pakistan chose to join the US in the “War on Terror”, and “stone-age” talk of Mr. Armitage notwithstanding, it was never forced into it. In fact, all president Bush asked Pakistan was, “Either you are with us or against us.” Pakistan chose to be “with the US”.
I quote here a small part from a research paper by Shabana Fayyaz, a lecturer in strategic defense studies at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan. The whole paper is really worth reading.
President Musharraf, in his nation-wide televised address on September 19, 2001, just after 9/11, said that at that juncture he was worried about Pakistan only … he gave top priority to the defense of Pakistan. Defense of any other country came later.
Following Pakistan’s decision to join the international coalition against terrorism, Pakistan was successful in altering its earlier “most sanctioned” status and “internationally isolated, economically fragile” image.
Musharraf proffered five reasons for choosing to offer “unstinted cooperation” to the US in its war against terrorism. The five reasons for choosing this course of action were: secure Pakistan’s strategic assets, safeguard the cause of Kashmir, prevent Pakistan from being declared a terrorist state, prevent an anti-Pakistani government from coming to power in Kabul and have Pakistan reemerge politically as a responsible and dignified nation.
This decision marked a U-turn in Pakistan’s decades-long security policy with respect to Afghanistan and set in motion the redefinition of its strategic priorities accompanied by the immense challenges on the home front. Here the Musharraf government’s decision to ally with the US was a rational “choice” based on the realization of prevailing domestic (economic, social, political, sectarian threats), regional and international trends prior to 9/11.
K.B. Kale, Camp, the US
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K B Kale, On a brief visit to USA | Mon, 13/06/2011 - 19:06pm

Some unpublished part of my letter:
Quote
To quote Pakistani security analyst Syed Rifaat Hussain, the qualitative shift in Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy was based on the several key considerations like
(a) Come out on the right side of history;
(b) avoid American retribution;
(c) prevent the emergence of an Indo-US axis against Pakistan with dire consequences for country’s survival;
(d) get sanctions lifted, put Pak-US ties back on track, gain international legitimacy for his own military regime and most importantly create political and social space for Pakistan to deal with the ‘blow-back effects’ of the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan on Pakistani society.
Whether Pakistan achieved all of the following stated objectives is besides the point. What is important is Pakistan government made these choices.
So why shed tears of repentance now?
Unquote